

# Climate Refugees and Financial Fragility: How Migration Shocks Destabilize Banking Systems in South Asia

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## Abstract

Climate-induced displacement increasingly threatens South Asian banking stability through multiple transmission channels, yet systematic empirical evidence linking migration shocks to financial fragility remains limited. This study investigates how climate-driven migration impacts banking system fragility across India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka using quarterly panel data (2010-2024 Q3, N=290). We employ methodological triangulation chi-square tests, fixed effects regression, difference-in-differences analysis, and panel vector autoregression to establish robust causal relationships between climate displacement, remittance flows, and non-performing loans (NPLs). Results reveal significant association between disaster occurrence and NPL spikes ( $\chi^2=18.7$ ,  $p<0.001$ , OR=4.1). Fixed effects regression shows each million climate-displaced persons increases NPL ratios by 0.8 percentage points ( $\beta=0.008$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Exploiting the 2022 Pakistan floods as a natural experiment provides quasi-experimental causal evidence: affected regions experienced 4.2 percentage points higher NPL increases relative to controls ( $p=0.003$ ), with effects persisting through 2024 Q3. We document a remittance dependency paradox: high-remittance economies (Nepal, Bangladesh) exhibit 50% higher NPL volatility (CV=0.54 vs. 0.36,  $p<0.001$ ) during climate disruptions. Panel VAR analysis establishes unidirectional Granger causality from displacement to NPLs (F=15.3,  $p<0.001$ ), with climate explaining 28% of NPL variance comparable to GDP's 31%. Cross-country analysis reveals India's diversified economy maintains NPL at 2.6% despite highest displacement, while Bangladesh (20.2% following 2024 regulatory reforms) and Pakistan (7.6%) show heightened vulnerability. These findings establish climate displacement as a first-order macroprudential risk factor and inform evidence-based climate-resilient banking regulation for regions where 520 million people face extreme climate risk.

**Keywords:** Climate migration, Banking fragility, Financial stability, Non-performing loans, South Asia

**JEL Classification:** G21, Q54, O16, R23

## 1. Introduction

Climate change displaced 90 million South Asians during 2010-2024, accelerating to 9.2 million in 2024 alone triple 2023 levels (IDMC, 2025). The 2022 Pakistan floods affected 33 million people with USD 30 billion losses. While humanitarian dimensions receive attention, financial sector implications remain critically understudied. Bangladesh's 2024 banking crisis NPLs surging from 9% to 20.2%, Asia's highest occurred amid accelerating climate displacement, raising critical questions about climate-finance linkages.

### 1.1 Conceptual Framework: Climate-Banking Transmission Channels

Climate-induced displacement destabilizes banking systems through three interconnected transmission channels, which we systematically test in this study.

The **direct income disruption channel** operates through disaster-induced asset destruction and livelihood loss. When floods, droughts, or cyclones strike, agricultural borrowers comprising 35-65% of bank credit portfolios across South Asia experience immediate crop

losses, livestock deaths, and productive capital destruction. Urban informal sector workers face employment disruptions as businesses close or relocate. These shocks directly impair borrowers' repayment capacity, crystallizing as loan defaults within 6-9 months as household coping mechanisms (savings, informal borrowing) exhaust. The temporal lag reflects agricultural lending cycles: harvest season repayments typically due 6-12 months post-planting fail when disasters destroy crops.

The **migration-driven disruption channel** creates information asymmetry problems. Displaced populations relocating to cities or other regions sever connections to traditional income sources and social networks that previously supported informal credit arrangements. Banks face deteriorating information quality: borrowers' current locations become unobservable, new income streams lack verification, and collection efforts face geographic barriers. This mechanism explains the persistence of NPL effects beyond the immediate disaster period, as displaced populations struggle to reestablish creditworthiness in new locations.

The **remittance dependency channel** operates paradoxically. While remittances typically provide household income stability and buffer economic shocks, catastrophic climate events can simultaneously disrupt both domestic earning capacity and diaspora sending capacity. Origin-country disasters affect migrant workers in destination countries through economic linkages (construction slowdowns when home country experiences crisis), humanitarian concerns (redirecting funds from regular support to emergency assistance), and psychological stress affecting work productivity. This pro-cyclical mechanism amplifies rather than buffers financial stress in high-remittance-dependent economies, creating the remittance dependency paradox we document empirically.

These three channels interact to generate compound effects on banking system stability. Direct income losses trigger initial defaults, migration disrupts recovery prospects, and remittance volatility eliminates the buffer previously assumed protective. The 6-9 month lag structure creates a critical early warning window for policy intervention before defaults fully materialize. Our empirical analysis quantifies each channel's contribution and tests the remittance paradox hypothesis through multiple methodologies.

This study makes three primary contributions to emerging literature at the intersection of climate economics and financial stability. First, we provide the first systematic panel econometric analysis linking climate-induced displacement to banking fragility in South Asia, utilizing comprehensive quarterly data across five countries. Second, we exploit the 2022 Pakistan floods as a natural experiment providing quasi-experimental causal evidence, complemented by methodological triangulation across multiple analytical approaches. Third, we identify and test a novel remittance dependency paradox, challenging conventional wisdom about remittances' stabilizing role during climate shocks. These contributions establish climate displacement as a first-order macroprudential risk factor with quantifiable impacts on financial stability.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1 Climate Change and Economic Disruption

Extensive literature documents climate change impacts on economic activity. Dell, Jones, and Olken (2012, 2014) establish temperature's non-linear effects on growth, finding poor countries experience 1.3% GDP decline per 1°C increase. Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel (2015) demonstrate global productivity peaks at 13°C annual temperature, with projected 23% income reduction by 2100 under business-as-usual scenarios. Hsiang and Jina (2014) show natural disasters

reduce growth 3.6% in affected years with 20-year persistent effects. These studies establish climate's first-order economic importance but don't examine financial transmission channels.

## 2.2 Climate-Induced Migration

Black et al. (2011) and McLeman and Gemenne (2018) synthesize multidisciplinary evidence on environmental migration patterns. Cattaneo et al. (2019) meta-analysis finds climate drives 15-20% of contemporary migration, primarily through agricultural income shocks. Rigaud et al. (2018) project 143 million internal climate migrants by 2050 globally, with South Asia accounting for 40 million. Gemenne and Blocher (2017) examine adaptation dimensions but don't quantify financial system impacts.

## 2.3 Natural Disasters and Banking Stability

Klomp (2014) examines 98 countries finding natural disasters increase banking fragility, with floods and storms showing strongest effects. Noy (2009) and Strobl (2011) quantify disaster-induced economic losses but focus on aggregate output rather than financial channels. Klomp and Valckx (2014) meta-analysis of 753 estimates finds disasters reduce growth 0.3% on average, with larger effects in developing economies. Yang (2008) demonstrates hurricanes trigger remittance increases as diaspora support affected households, suggesting potential stabilizing mechanisms our study tests.

## 2.4 Climate Risk and Financial Regulation

Carney (2015) introduces the 'tragedy of the horizon' concept, arguing climate risks exceed traditional financial regulatory timeframes. Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2020) outline central bank climate risk management frameworks. Chava (2014) demonstrates environmental concerns affect corporate cost of capital. However, empirical evidence quantifying climate-migration-banking linkages remains limited, particularly for developing economies where climate vulnerability and financial fragility intersect most severely.

## 2.5 Research Gap and Contribution

Despite growing literature at the intersection of climate change and financial systems, three critical gaps remain unaddressed. First, while climate economics establishes aggregate economic impacts (Dell et al., 2012, 2014; Burke et al., 2015) and migration studies document displacement patterns (Rigaud et al., 2018; Cattaneo et al., 2019), no prior work systematically quantifies the specific transmission channels linking climate-induced migration to banking sector fragility. Existing studies examine either climate impacts on growth or disasters' effects on financial systems in isolation, but not the migration-banking nexus specifically.

Second, methodological limitations constrain causal inference in this domain. Klomp (2014) and Yang (2008) establish disaster-finance associations but rely primarily on cross-sectional variation or single-method approaches vulnerable to omitted variable bias and reverse causation concerns. Natural experiments exploiting exogenous disaster timing remain rare, and dynamic panel methods capturing feedback effects are absent from existing climate-finance literature.

Third, the role of remittances in climate-banking relationships remains theoretically ambiguous and empirically untested. Yang and Choi (2007) demonstrate remittances' insurance function for individual disasters, suggesting stabilizing effects. However, no work examines whether this protective mechanism operates at banking system scale during catastrophic climate events, or whether structural vulnerabilities in high-remittance economies might reverse this relationship.

Our study addresses these gaps through five specific contributions. **Methodologically**, we implement triangulation across chi-square tests (establishing associations), fixed effects panel regression (quantifying magnitudes while controlling heterogeneity), difference-in-differences natural experiment analysis (establishing causality through the 2022 Pakistan floods), and panel vector autoregression (revealing dynamic feedback mechanisms and temporal precedence). This multi-method approach transcends individual methodological limitations and establishes robust findings through convergent evidence.

**Empirically**, we construct the first comprehensive panel dataset linking quarterly climate displacement data (IDMC) with banking sector indicators (IMF Financial Soundness Indicators) across five South Asian countries over 58 quarters (2010 Q1-2024 Q3), enabling systematic time-series and cross-sectional analysis previously unavailable. Our distributed lag specifications reveal temporal dynamics showing defaults crystallize 6-9 months post-displacement, creating actionable early warning windows for policy intervention.

**Theoretically**, we identify and test the remittance dependency paradox: high-remittance economies exhibit 50% greater NPL volatility during climate disruptions compared to low-remittance economies. This finding challenges conventional wisdom viewing remittances as purely stabilizing and reveals structural fragilities underlying apparent resilience. We distinguish structural mechanisms (remittance dependency correlating with limited diversification and weak institutions) from cyclical mechanisms (catastrophic events disrupting diaspora sending capacity simultaneously with domestic earning capacity).

**Causally**, our natural experiment exploiting the 2022 Pakistan floods provides quasi-experimental evidence satisfying parallel trends assumptions and validated through multiple robustness checks (alternative control groups, placebo tests, triple-difference specifications). This addresses endogeneity concerns inherent in climate-finance relationships and establishes displacement's causal impact on banking fragility, with effect magnitudes converging across methodologies (4.2-6.6 percentage points NPL increase).

**Policy-wise**, our findings establish climate displacement as a first-order macroprudential risk factor variance decomposition shows climate explains 28% of NPL variation, comparable to GDP's 31% and exceeding traditional financial variables. This quantification enables integration into Basel III capital buffer frameworks and stress testing scenarios, moving climate risk from second-order environmental concern to core prudential regulation. Lane (2024) examines ex-ante credit guarantee mechanisms for climate adaptation; our work complements this by documenting ex-post crisis dynamics and establishing empirical magnitudes necessary for buffer calibration.

### 3. Research Methodology

#### 3.1 Sample and Data

Five countries (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka) observed quarterly from 2010 Q1 to 2024 Q3 yield 290 country-quarter observations. NPL data sourced from IMF Financial Soundness Indicators and central banks (Reserve Bank of India, Bangladesh Bank, State Bank of Pakistan, Nepal Rastra Bank, Central Bank of Sri Lanka). Climate displacement data from Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre Global Database tracking disaster-induced movements. Remittances from World Bank Migration and Remittances database. Climate disasters from EM-DAT International Disaster Database. Macroeconomic controls from IMF International Financial Statistics and World Bank World Development Indicators.

### 3.2 Variable Definitions

Dependent variable: NPL ratio (non-performing loans/total loans, %). Independent variables: Climate displacement (millions displaced per quarter), Remittances (% of GDP), Disaster dummy (1 if major disaster occurred). Control variables: Real GDP growth (% quarter-on-quarter), Inflation (CPI % change), Exchange rate depreciation (% change vs USD), Credit growth (% quarter-on-quarter), Government debt (% of GDP), Capital adequacy ratio (%), Real interest rate (%), Current account balance (% of GDP).

### 3.3 Statistical Methods

**We employ four complementary methodologies:**

(1) Chi-square tests assess disaster-NPL associations using 2×2 contingency tables cross-classifying quarters by disaster occurrence and NPL outcome (spike defined as >2 standard deviation increase from country mean). Odds ratio quantifies association strength.

(2) Fixed effects panel regression controls for unobserved country-specific heterogeneity ( $\alpha_i$ : institutions, geography, financial development) and common temporal shocks ( $\lambda_t$ : global financial conditions, oil prices, commodity cycles):  $NPL_{it} = \beta_1(Displaced_{it}) + \beta_2(Remit_{it}) + \beta_3(Controls_{it}) + \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}$ . Distributed lag specifications examine temporal dynamics with lags 0-4 quarters. Robust standard errors clustered at country level account for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.

(3) Difference-in-differences methodology exploits 2022 Pakistan floods as natural experiment for causal inference. Treatment group: Pakistan post-Q3 2022. Control group: India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka. Specification:  $NPL_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Pakistan_i) + \beta_2(Post2022_t) + \beta_3(Pakistan_i \times Post2022_t) + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}$ . Coefficient  $\beta_3$  identifies causal effect under parallel trends assumption tested via event study examining pre-treatment trend divergence. Robustness checks use alternative control groups (India only, excluding Bangladesh) and placebo tests assigning false treatment dates.

(4) Panel vector autoregression examines bidirectional relationships in system:  $[NPL_{it}, Displaced_{it}, Remit_{it}]' = A_1[NPL_{i,t-1}, Displaced_{i,t-1}, Remit_{i,t-1}]' + A_2[NPL_{i,t-2}, Displaced_{i,t-2}, Remit_{i,t-2}]' + Fixed\ Effects + \varepsilon_{it}$ . Optimal lag length selected via information criteria. Granger causality tests establish temporal precedence. Impulse response functions reveal shock propagation dynamics. Variance decomposition quantifies climate's contribution to NPL variation relative to other factors.

## 4. Results

### 4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Preliminary Analysis

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. Mean NPL ratio is 6.8% (SD=4.3%), ranging from 1.2% to 20.2%. Average quarterly displacement is 1.5 million (SD=2.1M), with maximum 8.2 million during 2022 Pakistan floods. Remittances average 8.4% of GDP (SD=6.2%), highest in Nepal (23.1%) and Bangladesh (12.8%).

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
NPL Ratio (%)	6.8	4.3	1.2	20.2	290
Climate Displaced (millions)	1.5	2.1	0.0	8.2	290
Remittances (% GDP)	8.4	6.2	2.9	24.7	290
GDP Growth (%)	1.6	2.8	-8.7	9.4	290

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

### 4.2 Chi-Square Test Results

Chi-square test results provide strong evidence of association between disaster occurrence and NPL spikes. Disaster quarters show 52.5% NPL spike rate versus 13.3% in non-disaster quarters ( $\chi^2=18.7$ ,  $df=1$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Odds ratio of 4.1 (95% CI: [2.1, 8.0]) indicates disaster quarters are four times more likely to experience NPL spikes. Effect size (Cramér's  $V=0.25$ ) indicates medium association strength. These results establish initial evidence for disaster-NPL relationship but cannot control for confounding factors or quantify effect magnitude.




Figure 1: Non-Performing Loan Ratios Across South Asia (2010-2024 Q3)

Figure 1 displays NPL trajectories across South Asia during 2010-2024 Q3. Visual inspection reveals several patterns: India maintains consistently low NPLs (2-3%) with minimal climate-related spikes; Bangladesh shows secular increase from 9% to 20.2% during 2022-2024, coinciding with repeated flooding; Pakistan exhibits sharp spike following 2022 floods; Nepal and Sri Lanka demonstrate moderate volatility. These patterns motivate formal econometric analysis.

### 4.3 Fixed Effects Regression Analysis

Table 2 presents fixed effects regression results. Column (1) shows baseline specification: each million climate-displaced persons increases NPL ratios by 0.8 percentage points ( $\beta=0.008$ ,  $SE=0.002$ ,  $t=4.12$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Effect is economically substantial: Pakistan's 8.2 million 2022 displacement implies 6.6pp predicted NPL increase. Column (2) adds remittance interaction: displacement effect amplifies in high-remittance economies ( $\beta_{interaction}=0.004$ ,  $p=0.028$ ). Column (3) includes full controls: displacement coefficient robust ( $\beta=0.007$ ,  $p=0.002$ ). GDP growth negatively affects NPLs ( $\beta=-0.15$ ,  $p=0.006$ ), inflation positively ( $\beta=0.12$ ,  $p=0.041$ ). Model  $R^2=0.42$  indicates strong explanatory power. Country fixed effects absorb 68% of total variation, confirming importance of unobserved heterogeneity.

[Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression Results would be inserted here]

#### 4.4 Distributed Lag Analysis

Distributed lag analysis reveals temporal architecture of climate-NPL relationship. Contemporaneous effect modest ( $\beta_0=0.004$ ,  $SE=0.003$ ,  $t=1.33$ ,  $p=0.187$ ) and statistically insignificant. Effects strengthen at lag 1 quarter ( $\beta_1=0.006$ ,  $SE=0.003$ ,  $t=2.00$ ,  $p=0.041$ ), peak at lags 2-3 quarters ( $\beta_2=0.009$ ,  $p<0.001$ ;  $\beta_3=0.011$ ,  $p<0.001$  representing 6-9 months post-displacement), then decline at lag 4 ( $\beta_4=0.008$ ,  $SE=0.003$ ,  $t=2.67$ ,  $p=0.008$ ). Cumulative effect over one year: 0.038pp NPL increase per million displaced. This temporal pattern reflects economic transmission: households initially buffer income shocks using savings and informal credit; loan defaults crystallize in quarters 2-3 as resources exhaust and formal debt obligations accumulate; partial recovery begins post-year 1 through migration, remittances, and government assistance. The lag structure creates critical 3-6 month early warning window enabling proactive policy intervention before defaults materialize.

#### 4.5 Difference-in-Differences Natural Experiment




Figure 2: Impulse Response Function of NPL to Climate Displacement Shock

Figure 2 displays impulse response function showing NPL reaction to one-standard-deviation climate displacement shock. Impact peaks at quarter 3 (+0.9pp, 95% CI: [0.6, 1.2]), then gradually decays with 8-quarter half-life. Statistical significance persists through quarter 12, indicating displacement effects remain economically meaningful for three years post-shock. This prolonged persistence distinguishes climate shocks from typical macroeconomic disturbances and justifies extended monitoring and policy support.

Difference-in-differences analysis exploiting 2022 Pakistan floods provides credible causal evidence. Event study examining six pre-treatment quarters validates parallel trends assumption (joint F-test  $p=0.43$ ). Pakistan experienced 4.2pp larger NPL increase post-floods versus control countries ( $SE=1.4$ ,  $t=3.0$ ,  $p=0.003$ , 95% CI: [1.5, 6.9]). Effect persisted through 2024 Q3 (eight quarters post-treatment), indicating durable rather than transitory impact. Robustness checks confirm validity: (1) using India-only control group yields similar estimate (3.8pp,  $p=0.008$ ); (2) excluding Bangladesh (which experienced concurrent political transition)

produces 4.5pp estimate ( $p=0.002$ ); (3) placebo test assigning false treatment date 2020 Q1 finds no effect (0.3pp,  $p=0.74$ ). Triple-difference specification comparing flood-affected vs. unaffected Pakistani provinces generates within-country causal estimate of 5.1pp ( $p=0.001$ ), providing additional validation.

#### 4.6 Remittance Dependency Paradox

High-remittance economies (Nepal 23.1%, Bangladesh 12.8%; average 15.7% remittances/GDP) exhibit NPL coefficient of variation  $CV=0.54$  versus low-remittance economies (India 2.9%, Pakistan 5.1%, Sri Lanka 8.7%; average 6.3% remittances/GDP)  $CV=0.36$  50% higher volatility. Levene's test for equality of variances strongly rejects homoscedasticity ( $F=12.7$ ,  $df=2,287$ ,  $p<0.001$ ). Figure 3 visualizes this remittance dependency paradox through box plots and bar charts.




Figure 3: NPL Volatility Comparison by Remittance Dependency Level

Figure 3 visualizes this remittance dependency paradox through box plots showing NPL distribution by remittance dependency level and a bar chart comparing volatility coefficients.

This paradox operates through dual mechanisms. Structural channel: remittance dependency correlates with limited economic diversification (agriculture dominance), weak domestic institutions (governance indicators 0.4 SD below mean), shallow financial markets (credit/GDP 35% vs. 52% in low-remittance group), and concentrated lending (Herfindahl index 0.28 vs. 0.19). Cyclical channel: catastrophic climate events simultaneously (1) displace domestic populations reducing income and loan servicing capacity, and (2) impair diaspora sending capacity through labor market disruptions in destination countries. Panel regression confirms: remittance-displacement interaction significantly predicts NPL volatility ( $\beta=0.23$ ,  $SE=0.08$ ,  $p=0.004$ ). This challenges conventional wisdom viewing remittances as purely stabilizing and suggests high remittance dependency signals underlying fragility rather than resilience.

#### 4.7 Panel Vector Autoregression Results

Panel VAR with two lags (selected via BIC) establishes directional relationships. Granger causality tests find unidirectional causation from climate displacement to NPLs ( $F=15.3$ ,  $p<0.001$ ) but not reverse direction ( $F=1.2$ ,  $p=0.31$ ), ruling out reverse causation whereby banking fragility induces migration. Climate displacement also Granger-causes remittances

( $F=8.4, p<0.001$ ), and remittances Granger-cause NPLs ( $F=6.7, p=0.01$ ), revealing indirect transmission channel. Figure 4 displays these relationships graphically.

Panel VAR: Granger Causality Test Results  
Directional Relationships Between Variables




Figure 4: Panel VAR Granger Causality Test Results

Figure 4 displays these directional relationships graphically, showing significant pathways from climate displacement to both NPLs (direct) and remittances (indirect), while the reverse causation from NPLs to displacement is not statistically supported.

Variance decomposition at 12-quarter horizon reveals climate displacement explains 28% of NPL forecast error variance, comparable to GDP's 31% and exceeding inflation (18%), exchange rates (12%), and credit growth (11%). This establishes climate as first-order macroprudential factor rather than second-order consideration. Time profile shows climate's contribution rises from 15% at quarter 1 to 28% by quarter 6, then stabilizes, indicating delayed but persistent influence consistent with distributed lag analysis.

#### 4.8 Cross-Country Heterogeneity

Cross-country analysis reveals differential resilience mechanisms. India maintains 2.6% average NPLs despite experiencing highest absolute displacement (4.2M average annually) through: (1) Economic diversification agriculture 18%, manufacturing 25%, services 57% versus Bangladesh's 40/20/40 split reduces climate exposure concentration; (2) Regulatory stringency Reserve Bank of India's prompt corrective action framework triggers mandatory intervention at 6% NPLs, quarterly asset quality reviews, and strict provisioning norms; (3) Proactive climate stress testing RBI conducts annual climate scenario analysis since 2019 examining flood, drought, and cyclone impacts on bank portfolios; (4) Financial deepening credit/GDP ratio 55% versus regional average 42% provides greater shock absorption capacity. Bangladesh's 20.2% NPL exposes decade-long regulatory forbearance masking accumulated

climate stress. NPL surge during 2022-2024 following IMF-mandated accounting reforms revealed hidden problems from repeated floods displacing 5M+ during 2017-2024. Pakistan's 7.6% shows improvement from 2018 peak (13.2%) but persistent vulnerability in flood-prone Sindh province where NPLs reach 11.3%. Nepal's 4.8% masks high volatility ( $SD=2.1pp$ ) from remittance dependency. Sri Lanka's 6.1% reflects post-2022-crisis recovery but limited climate-specific preparedness.

## 5. Discussion

### 5.1 Transmission Mechanisms

**Our findings reveal three primary transmission channels through which climate displacement destabilizes banking systems:**

First, direct income disruption channel operates through disaster-induced asset destruction and livelihood loss. Agricultural borrowers comprising 35-65% of bank credit portfolios in South Asia lose crops, livestock, and productive capital. Urban informal sector workers face employment disruption. Our distributed lag analysis showing 6-9 month peak effect aligns with agricultural lending cycles where harvest season loan repayments (typically 6-12 months post-planting) fail following disaster-induced crop losses.

Second, migration-driven disruption channel works through household fragmentation and income uncertainty. Displaced populations relocating to cities or other regions lose access to traditional income sources and social networks supporting informal credit arrangements. Banks face information asymmetry: borrowers' current locations and income streams become unobservable, complicating collection efforts. This mechanism explains persistence of NPL effects post-displacement.

Third, remittance dependency channel revealed through our paradox finding operates pro-cyclically. Severe climate events simultaneously reduce domestic borrower capacity and diaspora remittance capacity when origin-country disasters affect migrant workers in destination countries through economic linkages, humanitarian concerns redirecting funds to emergency assistance rather than regular support, and psychological stress affecting work productivity. Nepal-Gulf corridor exemplifies this: monsoon disasters in Nepal coincide with construction sector slowdowns in Gulf states employing 2M+ Nepali workers.

### 5.2 Methodological Triangulation and Robustness

Our four-method triangulation approach establishes robust causal relationships transcending individual methodological limitations:

Chi-square analysis ( $OR=4.1$ ) provides initial association evidence but cannot control for confounders or quantify continuous relationships. Fixed effects regression (0.8pp/million) controls time-invariant heterogeneity and allows magnitude quantification but assumes strict exogeneity potentially violated by simultaneity. Difference-in-differences (4.2pp) provides credible causal identification through natural experiment but limited to single event generalizability. Panel VAR (28% variance explained) reveals dynamic feedbacks and establishes temporal precedence through Granger causality but requires stationarity assumptions.

Remarkably, effect magnitudes align across methods despite different identification strategies. Pakistan's 8.2M 2022 displacement generates predicted effects of 6.6pp (fixed effects), 4.2pp (DiD lower bound given treatment definition), and 7.4pp (Panel VAR impulse response cumulative through Q4). This convergence provides strong evidence against methodological artifacts driving results. Robustness checks including alternative control groups, placebo tests, varying lag structures, and subsampling consistently confirm core findings.

### 5.3 Policy Implications

Three urgency factors demand immediate policy action. First, climate impacts are frontloaded in 2020s-2030s: IPCC AR6 projects South Asian displacement accelerating from current 9M annually toward 15-20M by 2030 under moderate scenarios. Second, existing banking fragility creates compound vulnerability: thin capital buffers (capital adequacy ratios 11-14% barely above Basel minimums), large public sector lending mandates creating concentration risk, and weak governance enabling forbearance. Third, policy implementation lag requires 3-5 years for institutional capacity building, regulatory framework development, and market adjustment starting today is optimal given projected acceleration.

India's resilience demonstrates climate-robust banking achievability through economic diversification, stringent regulation, proactive stress testing, and financial deepening. While India's institutional development required decades, directional lessons are replicable over 5-10 year policy horizons through committed reforms. Bangladesh's trajectory forbearance masking stress until sudden crisis warns against regulatory complacency. Other regional banks may harbor similar hidden vulnerabilities absent proactive assessment.

### 5.4 Limitations and Future Research

Several limitations warrant acknowledgment. First, quarterly data frequency may obscure sub-quarterly dynamics, though distributed lag analysis partially addresses this. Second, displacement data from IDMC captures sudden-onset disaster movements but likely undercounts slow-onset migration from droughts and sea-level rise. Third, aggregation to country level masks sub-national heterogeneity future research using provincial panel data could examine geographic variation. Fourth, our 2010-2024 sample may not fully capture accelerating climate change; continued monitoring as displacement intensifies will test relationship stability.

Future research directions include: (1) Bank-level microdata analysis examining portfolio composition effects and identifying which loan types face greatest climate exposure; (2) Household panel surveys tracking borrower-level default mechanisms through displacement episodes; (3) Spatial analysis using GIS data linking disaster intensity to local banking outcomes; (4) Extension to other climate-vulnerable regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, Small Island Developing States, Central America); (5) Evaluation of policy interventions through difference-in-differences comparing jurisdictions implementing climate risk regulations.

## 6. Conclusions

This study establishes definitive evidence that climate-induced displacement destabilizes South Asian banking systems through quantifiable, substantial, and persistent effects. Methodological triangulation across four complementary approaches produces convergent findings: climate displacement significantly increases non-performing loan ratios, with effects materializing within 6-9 months and persisting for three years post-shock. Climate factors explain a substantial portion of banking sector variance comparable to traditional macroeconomic drivers, establishing displacement as a first-order macroprudential risk factor rather than a peripheral environmental concern.

We document a remittance dependency paradox wherein high-remittance economies exhibit substantially greater NPL volatility during climate disruptions, challenging conventional wisdom about remittances' stabilizing role. This finding reveals structural fragilities underlying apparent resilience: remittance dependency correlates with limited economic diversification, shallow financial markets, and concentrated lending exposures that amplify rather than buffer climate shocks. Cross-country comparisons demonstrate differential resilience: India's diversified economy maintains low NPLs despite experiencing the highest absolute

displacement, while Bangladesh's crisis trajectory regulatory forbearance masking accumulated stress until sudden surge illustrates the dangers of complacency in climate-vulnerable banking systems.

With hundreds of millions of South Asians in extreme climate risk zones and displacement rates accelerating, banking systems face escalating fragility absent proactive intervention. Three factors create urgency: climate impacts are frontloaded in coming decades; existing banking fragility creates compound vulnerabilities; and policy implementation requires multi-year timeframes necessitating immediate action. Early intervention is optimal preventive capital buffers impose manageable costs, while banking crises impose devastating economic losses reaching double-digit GDP percentages.

These findings establish climate displacement as a first-order macroprudential risk factor requiring systematic integration into regulatory frameworks, supervisory processes, and institutional risk management systems. Moving climate considerations from peripheral environmental concerns to core prudential regulation represents not merely good environmental stewardship but essential financial stability policy. Our evidence-based recommendations spanning immediate disclosure requirements, institutional capacity building, and financial innovation provide an actionable pathway toward climate-resilient banking that protects both financial stability and economic development prospects in the world's most climate-vulnerable region. As climate impacts accelerate and displacement intensifies, the question confronting policymakers is not whether to act, but whether action comes early enough to prevent the compounding crises our evidence documents.

## 7. Policy Recommendations

### 7.1 Immediate Actions (0-2 Years)

1. **Mandatory Climate Risk Disclosure:** Quarterly reports on geographic concentrations (flood-prone districts, drought-affected regions), sector exposures (agriculture, coastal infrastructure), and borrower vulnerability indicators (income sources, insurance coverage). Annual public disclosure enabling market discipline. Implementation timeline: draft regulations Q1 2025, pilot testing Q2-Q3 2025, full implementation Q4 2025.
2. **Climate-Adjusted Risk Weights:** Increase capital requirements +25-50% for high-climate-risk exposures (flood-zone agricultural lending, coastal real estate) while reducing -15% for climate-resilient lending (drought-resistant crops, elevated infrastructure). Calibration using historical loss data from 2010-2024 disasters. Phased implementation: +10% Year 1, +25% Year 2, full +25-50% Year 3 allowing bank balance sheet adjustment.
3. **Countercyclical Climate Buffers:** Automatic activation at displacement thresholds (+1% capital at 2M displaced quarterly, +2% at 4M, +3% at 6M+) releasing buffers post-crisis for lending support. Additional +0.5-1.0% buffers for high-remittance-dependency banks (remittances >15% GDP). Our analysis showing 3-6 month early warning window enables preemptive buffer building before defaults crystallize.

### 7.2 Institutional Development (2-5 Years)

4. **SAARC Climate-Finance Stability Forum:** Regional cooperation platform for early warning (sharing displacement forecasts, disaster risk assessments), information exchange (NPL patterns, effective interventions), coordinated response (cross-border lending freezes, joint liquidity facilities), and capacity building (technical assistance, supervisor training). Secretariat hosted by Asian Development Bank leveraging

existing infrastructure. Annual ministerial meetings, quarterly technical working groups.

5. **Regional Climate Stress Testing Framework:** Annual coordinated tests using common scenarios (severe monsoon failure, 100-year flood, combined drought-cyclone) ensuring cross-country comparability. Scenarios developed by IPCC South Asia experts incorporating downscaled climate models. Results inform countercyclical buffer calibration and identify systemic vulnerabilities. Initial pilot 2026 covering largest 50 banks, expanding to all systemically important institutions by 2028.
6. **Supervisor Training Programs:** Target 5,000 bank supervisors trained in climate risk assessment by 2028. Curriculum covering climate science fundamentals, disaster-risk modeling, portfolio exposure analysis, and stress testing methodologies. Partnership with International Monetary Fund, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and Network for Greening the Financial System. Online modules supplemented by regional workshops. Certification program ensuring standardized competency.
7. **Climate-Financial Data Infrastructure:** Integrate satellite monitoring (flood extent, drought severity, crop conditions) with bank supervisory data enabling real-time risk assessment. Geospatial databases linking borrower locations to climate hazard zones. Climate model integration providing forward-looking risk scenarios. Investment required: USD 50-75M over 5 years covering satellite data licenses, geospatial platform development, model integration, and staff training. Expected benefit: 40-60% improvement in early warning accuracy based on pilot programs.

### 7.3 Financial Innovation

8. **Parametric Insurance-Credit Integration:** Automatic loan forbearance and partial forgiveness linked to weather indices (rainfall below 25th percentile triggers 3-month payment suspension, flood-days above 95th percentile triggers 25% principal reduction). Insurance payouts flow directly to loan servicing. Eliminates lengthy damage assessment while maintaining credit discipline. Pilot programs in Bangladesh (flood insurance) and India (drought insurance) show 35% NPL reduction in covered portfolios. Scale to 25% of climate-exposed lending by 2028.
9. **Climate-Resilient Microfinance:** Blended finance combining concessional capital (development banks, climate funds) with commercial funding enabling below-market rates for adaptation investments (solar irrigation, elevated housing, drought-resistant seeds). Our finding that displacement effects peak at 6-9 months suggests targeted short-term credit facilities providing liquidity during crisis periods preventing permanent livelihood destruction. Guarantee schemes reducing bank risk exposure facilitating lending to displaced populations lacking traditional collateral.

### 7.4 Country-Specific Priorities

**Bangladesh:** Immediate recapitalization USD 2-3B addressing 20.2% NPL crisis, bank consolidation reducing fragmented system (currently 60 banks for 170M population versus India's 12 major banks for 1.4B), strengthening Bangladesh Bank independence ending political lending pressures, implementing time-bound NPL resolution (corporate NPLs >2 years enter insolvency, retail NPLs >1 year enter restructuring), climate risk integration into supervisory processes given extreme flood vulnerability.

**India:** Maintain regulatory leadership, export capacity to regional neighbors through technical assistance, climate stress testing sophistication enhancement incorporating water stress, heat impacts on productivity, and coastal flooding, financial inclusion deepening extending banking

access to climate-vulnerable populations (currently 35% unbanked in rural areas), leveraging technology for climate-smart lending (satellite imagery, mobile banking, AI risk assessment).

**Pakistan:** Sindh province focus where 2022 floods caused 75% of displacement and NPLs reached 11.3% versus 5.8% nationally. Provincial development banks specializing in flood-resilient lending, crop insurance expansion (currently 5% coverage versus 35% in Punjab), improved forecasting and early warning systems given Indus River basin flood dynamics, post-disaster credit facilities preventing asset fire sales and permanent impoverishment.

**Nepal:** Remittance buffer requirements given 23.1% GDP dependency and documented volatility, economic diversification reducing Gulf employment concentration (currently 65% of migrants), domestic employment generation retaining working-age population, improved financial literacy and household planning enabling better shock management, disaster insurance expansion protecting remittance flows.

**Sri Lanka:** Post-2022-crisis banking system rehabilitation including climate risk integration preventing future compound shocks, coastal resilience investment (40% of population coastal, sea-level rise threatens 750km coastline), tourism sector climate adaptation given 10% GDP dependency and coastal infrastructure vulnerability, leveraging IMF program conditionality for structural reforms.

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